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 Does Political Reservation for
Women Improve Programme
Delivery?
This column outlines results of a study that
assesses the impact of women leaders on
corruption and other aspects of the quality of
delivery of MNREGA. It argues that
administrative experience, training and
institutional support are essential for making
women’s political participation and afﬁrmative
action policies more effective.
Political reservations for women create a ‘potential of presence’
(Agarwal 2010), and offer prospects of diversity and other
governance benefits. However, in settings where gender
discrimination may affect the characteristics and attitudes of
candidates for political office, women representatives are less
likely to be politically or administratively experienced. Thus,
even if women political leaders were inherently more
development-oriented than their male counterparts, existing
disparities might initially blur and significantly delay the onset
of governance gains.
While evidence on the quality of public service delivery in Gram
Panchayats (GPs) headed by women in India is unclear
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Ban and Rao 2008), research
on the impact of female leadership on corruption in public
programmes is practically absent. This fundamental neglect is of
immediate policy relevance given the renewed global
commitment to increasing women’s participation in political life
(World Development Report 2012) and the intense debate
within India about whether to reserve state and national
legislature seats for women or not.
Political reservation for women and corruption
In a recent study I, along with my co-authors, assess the impact
of women political leaders on corruption and other aspects of
the quality of delivery of India’s most ambitious public
programme to-date – the Mahatama Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) (Afridi Iversen Sharan
2012). By exploiting data both across GPs and over time in the
same GPs we are able to study whether and how governance
outcomes are affected as female leaders accumulate knowledge
and experience.
We use data from primary survey of households, GPs and
mandal level (sub-district) development officers as well as audit
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mandal level (sub-district) development officers as well as audit
reports from 2006-2010 for 300 GPs on the implementation of
projects under MNREGA in Andhra Pradesh. Utilising the
nation-wide policy of randomly reserving one-third of village
council headships for women, we find that the likelihood of
inefficiencies and leakages in these projects are higher in village
councils reserved for women sarpanchs. These conclusions hold
both for processes for which the GP is primarily responsible as
well as those for which it shares responsibilities with other
programme functionaries. For instance, in female reserved GPs,
the probability of a household being asked for a bribe to obtain
a job card was more than 6 percentage points higher than in
unreserved GPs. Delays in wage payments due – a strong hint of
administrative inefficiency – are more common in female
reserved GPs. On being asked to verify labour records,
households are almost 6 percentage points more likely to find
discrepancies between actual and official records of wage
payments under the programme in GPs reserved for females.
Learning by doing
Looking at audit reports for the unchanged elected sarpanchs
and accounting for variation in the performance of GPs over
time, we find that although the number of irregularities in
MNREGA implementation – in both labour and materials
related component of the programme – were significantly higher
in female reserved village councils at the onset of the
programme, these decline with the duration of the tenure of the
head or sarpanch.
We do not find evidence supportive of reporting biases, gender
stereotypes or differences in the probability of re-election of
male and female sarpanchs as possible explanations for these
results. However, the audit data which also contain information
about functionaries on whom malfeasance in programme
implementation was pinned indicate that sub-district level
bureaucrats are more likely to be held accountable for
discrepancies in the MNREGA programme in female reserved
village councils. The latter suggests greater vulnerability to
bureaucratic capture in village councils reserved for a woman
head, a vulnerability that is likely to be aggravated by the lack
of prior political and administrative experience of female
sarpanchs. Indeed, in instances where female sarpanchs have
prior political experience and are less likely to require assistance
in executing their day to day duties, the governance of the
programme is significantly better.
Note that the level of gender parity and women’s education in
Andhra Pradesh is higher than the national average. Our
estimates, therefore, are likely to represent lower bounds on the
effect of women leaders on public programme implementation
in India and elsewhere. Thus, in states such as Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh, which have higher levels of gender discrimination, the
effect of political reservations for women on the
implementation of public programme may be much worse. But
at the same time, the potential gains from learning by doing
over time could be significantly higher.
Resonating with other studies, we also find that the probability
that a programme related grievance is made by a woman, and
the number of complaints registered by women during an
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the number of complaints registered by women during an
official audit is higher in female reserved village councils. This
suggests that the presence of a female leader strengthens
women’s voice (Iyer et al. 2012).
Need for capacity building and institutional support
The findings reported here are of immediate policy relevance –
political and administrative experience can not only lower
corruption in public programme delivery but also expedite the
onset of governance gains in constituencies headed by women.
This highlights the need for capacity building and institutional
support to make women’s political participation and affirmative
action policies more effective. Lack of adequate administrative
support and training in the utilisation of financial resources by
grass roots institutions may seriously undermine the
effectiveness of public programmes and of affirmative action
policies in Indian and other developing countries.
Watch a video of Farzana Afridi presenting the underlying
research at the 3rd IGC ISI India Development Policy
Conference (July 2012; New Delhi)
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